The heads of state and sheikhs in the room all smiled, or in some cases laughed, albeit uncomfortably. All except Manouchehr Mottaki, the foreign minister of Iran, whose non-Arab country had unusually been invited this year as an observer, who remained stone-faced while he listened through headphones (for very few Iranians speak or understand Arabic), and who the television cameras mischievously panned up to as if to make Qaddafi’s point. (Iran is the only country in the region that staunchly supports, morally, financially, and militarily, Hamas, which, along with Islamic Jihad, remains committed to a one-state solution, i.e., a Palestinian state that encompasses all of Israel.) The smiles of the Arab leaders for the cameras betrayed their view of Qaddafi, known as well in the Arab world (at least among the ruling elites) for a certain, shall we say, wackiness, as he is in the West, as well as their discomfort with the truth of what their wacky, often clownish cousin was saying. That truth was being broadcast by Al Jazeera to millions of their citizens. Citizens who (according to polls in 2006 and 2007) were far more enamored of Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah of Lebanese Hezbollah and the lean, almost emaciated Mahmoud Ahmadinejad of Iran, perversely both Shias, than of their own smiling, Sunni, pro-Western, well-fed (and often corpulent) leaders.

The Arab League Summit, as in years past, was convened partly to address what was Qaddafi’s obsession in 2008 and what has been the single most important issue facing the Arab (and Muslim) world over the past 60 years, namely, what was once the Arab-Israeli, and is now simply the Palestinian-Israeli, conflict. (Ironically, the two nations Qaddafi mentioned by name, Jordan and Egypt, as having held Palestinian territory, are the two Arab countries that have made peace with Israel and have diplomatic relations with the Jewish state, a point certainly not lost on the television audience.)

It may not be obvious what any of this could possibly have to do with the upcoming presidential elections in the U.S. Qaddafi may possess a certain sartorial splendor, and his once kohl-rimmed eyes were, if nothing else, a curiosity uncommon to macho Arab leaders, but his proclamations have rarely been either realistic or of serious concern to Americans.

But the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is, ultimately, a crucial foreign policy issue for any American president who cares to make the world a safer and better place, a goal most recent presidents, George Bush excepted (until very recently, anyway), have acknowledged by their efforts to bring peace to the region. And for Americans Jews and many non-Jews, the Palestinian conflict has always loomed large, not just emotionally, but also in terms of how U.S. administrations, Democratic or Republican, deal with it. Qaddafi may have been way off-base in how he framed the conflict at the Damascus Summit, for it is probably safe to say that most Arabs and Muslims are realistic enough to recognize, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s inflammatory rhetoric notwithstanding, that Israel will neither disappear from the map or the “pages of time,” nor retreat anywhere behind pre-1967 borders.

But Qaddafi’s point, that Arab leaders have all but abandoned the Palestinian cause under intense pressure from the United States (and contrary to their citizens’ wishes), was not fantastical. And lest we forget, it was a few of those citizens who, well before the Iraq war, attacked the U.S. or U.S. interests (such as embassies and ships, and of course later New York and Washington). The Palestinian cause was given, at least partially, as the reason, or if you prefer, the excuse.

The U.S. is seen, whether most Americans like it or not, not just as a biased interlocutor or broker in the conflict but even as an impediment to the aspirations of the Palestinian people, not just by Arabs and Muslims, but by the outside world at large. Biased toward Israel, of course, to the point where it has become almost impossible for Palestinians (or other Arabs, even other Muslims) to trust America as a disinterested party. Naturally, no sane Palestinian sympathizer would believe that the U.S. will, under any administration, suddenly become a pro-Arab peacemaker, for U.S.-Israeli ties run deep, but in any election, and perhaps particularly this one, there is an opportunity to examine more closely where a candidate might lie when it comes to the Palestinian issue and how he or she might decide to affect it.

Senators John McCain and Barack Obama, the presumptive nominees for president in a race that pits a (traditional) white, Protestant male against a wildly popular African-American son of a Muslim Kenyan, have both emphasized their unwavering support for Israel, as is to be expected of any candidate who hopes to be elected to the highest office in the land. Senator Obama, however, earlier in his candidacy, intimated that his would be a more forceful, respectful and fair foreign policy as it applied to the Middle East. He brought some cheer to the Arab world (and to many Americans), although his more-Catholic-than-the-Pope moment, in an appearance at the AIPAC convention in late spring where he went further than any American president, even the most pro-Israeli in history, in stating that he believed that Jerusalem should remain the undivided capital of Israel “forever,” caused dismay in some quarters in the region. I happened to be talking to a senior Iranian government official the day of Obama’s appearance at AIPAC and he was astonished by the tone of his remarks.

“Is it that he has to say these things,” the official wondered out loud, “or is that the Israeli lobby is so strong that he daren’t execute a different foreign policy even if he wants to?” Senator Obama clarified his remarks later, backtracking somewhat and falling in line with official U.S. policy (and in recognition of U.N. resolutions) that the status of Jerusalem is a matter for negotiation between the Israelis and the Palestinians, but the Iranian official also added that day, wistfully, “How is it that there is no Muslim lobby in America that can even come close to having even a little influence, let alone challenge the Israeli lobby?”

The simplest answer to that is that Islam-phobia, if not outright anti-Muslim sentiment, rages unchecked in America, surely one reason that the son of a Muslim father, one who even continues to use his most Muslim of middle names, feels obliged to have his “more Catholic” moments and has to label the “accusations” that he is a Muslim a “smear.” (I was unaware that being a Muslim could be either.) Given those moments, and Senator Obama’s almost allergic stance toward anything to do with Islam, is there any reason to believe that he can play a different and more encouraging role in the Middle East peace process? (Senator McCain, we know, has not distinguished himself from the Bush administration on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict [or Israeli conflict with any entity], including in his steadfast refusal to commit to talks with groups such as Hezbollah and Hamas, despite the Israeli government’s own backdoor negotiations with both those stated enemies.) Can one take Obama at his word (his early words anyway) that one needs to talk to enemies as well as friends in order to resolve conflict?

“Change We Can Believe In,” one hopes, includes candidates for public office who don’t lie, and some “change” for the Muslim world, too. But perhaps it doesn’t matter, for Obama has the advantage of perception: that he will bring a new and more evenhanded approach to the Middle East that at the very least, according to him, involves respect for all parties involved. It’s one that has been eagerly awaited by parties (read: Muslim) who consider themselves perpetually aggrieved.

Obama’s summer trip to the Middle East, partly undertaken to reassure American Jews of his steadfast commitment to Israel and partly to burnish his foreign policy credentials, unfortunately did not do much to assuage the Muslim “street” with his appearances in Jerusalem, Amman and the West Bank (meeting with Mahmoud Abbas, something McCain has not yet done), simply because he appeared to be following a traditional U.S. line on the matter of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, albeit a far more nuanced one than in recent years. (Had Senator Obama ventured into Gaza, even without meeting with Hamas’ senior leadership, he would have gone far in Arab eyes, but realistically, he may have also lost the election before he set foot back on American soil. Ditto Damascus.)

Perhaps recognizing that a Hamas endorsement may win him friends in the Middle East, as it did when Hamas suggested they would be happy if he were president, but lose him many more votes in the U.S., Obama has since gone out of his way to distance himself from his earlier language of talking to one’s enemies. So Hezbollah, Hamas, and Bashar Assad will have to keep waiting for Obama’s attentions. But Obama did miss an opportunity nonetheless (even in his meeting with Abbas) to at least bring up the question of Hamas. It’s all well and good to dismiss them as a “terrorist organization” and refuse to deal with them, but if Obama is to be an effective peace-broker, he will have to address the issue of Hamas sooner rather than later. Mahmoud Abbas is incapable of making a deal with Israel without Hamas (or any deal he can make will be rendered useless), and he must be pressured to figure out a way to make a deal first with Hamas before he can make a state-creating deal with Israel. There will be no three-state solution, nor will there be a Palestinian state in the West Bank alone.

The issue of Hamas, the inconveniently democratically elected political party, refusing to recognize Israel’s right to exist (as a Jewish state), the issue that President Bush, John McCain and now Barack Obama have used as an excuse to ignore them, has always been a red herring: Who really cares if they recognize a “right to exist” before a deal is made, or if they “renounce terrorism”? What matters is whether they will explicitly or implicitly recognize that “right” and renounce the use of not just terror but all violence in negotiations, or in a final deal, and that should be the stance of anyone claiming to want to further the cause of peace in the region. Negotiations, after all, have the goal of reaching an agreement satisfactory to all parties.

Obama’s strength in his approach to the Middle East until now, as far as the Arabs are concerned, has been that he does not favor preconditions in any potential negotiations, but seemingly in this case, he does, which may be partly a reason for the somewhat subdued reaction to his trip from ordinary Arabs in the region, according to press reports. Senator Obama may have succeeded in appearing “presidential,” in dominating the world’s television screens and in seducing the Germans and the French, but he made no inroads with Middle Easterners, except, perhaps, in Israel.

Senator John McCain, who is likely to continue an unconditional-support-for-Israel policy, doesn’t seem to even consider the Palestinian issue a particularly pressing one. He has said that Iran is the No. 1 foreign policy challenge we face. Of course, many ordinary Americans who view foreign policy in terms of how it directly affects them might think that Iraq, with over a hundred thousand U.S. troops stationed there, is the true foreign policy issue, and others, including many on the left, believe that crushing Al Qaeda and capturing or killing Osama bin Laden and his lieutenants is the No. 1 foreign policy issue, but Senator McCain is rather more concerned with Iran, at least for now.

Senator McCain has mocked his opponent’s willingness to sit with Iranian leaders; “appeasement” he calls it (despite President Bush’s own “appeasement” of Iran at the Geneva nuclear talks of July 19, and his policy will be one of continuing the Bush administration’s efforts to isolate, choke and generally punish Iran into submission on the nuclear issue, and if that fails, to use military force to bring Iran to its knees.

Senator Obama, on the other hand, has retreated somewhat from his earlier eagerness to “jaw-jaw” (to use Churchill’s phrase) with President Ahmadinejad of Iran, but is still open to direct negotiations with the Iranian “leadership,” something that has worried some in the pro-Israeli camp but is, because of Obama’s refusal to take military action “off the table,” actually not a weaker position than his opponent’s.

Obama has also sounded a somewhat arrogant note in that respect recently, saying his willingness to meet Iranians would be “at the time and place of my choosing,” oddly precisely the sort of colonial language that the Second and Third World so resents, language that presumes not just an American superiority but also a desperate and supplicant negotiating partner who will ask “how high?” when asked to jump. The Iranians, one can be assured, can only react to that by actively working to deny him his choice of “time and place.”

The Iranians once offered to negotiate comprehensively with the Bush administration, way back in 2003, but presumably President Bush felt it wasn’t at the time and place of his choosing. What was his choosing were the 2007 talks in Baghdad, but we know how far that has gotten us. (Also, given that neither sanctions nor preconditions for negotiations, nor a perceived arrogant tone by the U.S., has worked in getting Iranians to slow their nuclear program, Senator Obama might do well to follow his own advice and view the Iranian issue as one of starting afresh with a new attitude.)

But beyond that, the people of the Muslim world, accustomed as they are now to American bombs falling on their heads should their leaders run afoul of American foreign policy, might generally applaud the concept of meaningful dialogue before the bombs are deployed. Senator Obama, brown himself, again has the benefit of perception, but as Condoleezza Rice may have come to realize, perception goes only so far.

No discussion of American foreign policy, though, is even partially complete without a discussion of Iraq. We know (or should know) that the Iraq war, that self-imposed suppurating wound, is not only the primary cause of the loss of American prestige throughout the world, but also by definition a primary foreign policy concern of whoever becomes president. Iraq cannot simply be ignored, as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was for six years by the Bush administration, in favor of some other adventure or distraction, even as the American public’s patience is wearing thin on hearing any news from the front. And the two candidates for president have divergent views on how America needs to stanch the flow, the river, it sometimes seems, of blood on the Mesopotamian plains: Senator McCain would like to “win” the war, a view befitting a military man, and Senator Obama would like our involvement to end, whether a win in the American column can be chalked up or not.

General George S. Patton once said, in 1944, that "Americans love a winner and will not tolerate a loser. Americans despise cowards. Americans play to win -- all the time. . . . The very thought of losing is hateful to an American." Indeed, Americans don’t love war; but they do love to win, and if Patton was right in his psychological analysis of his fellow citizens, then Senator McCain might be on the right track. But Patton spoke before America had ever lost a war, and many Americans today see Iraq as an unwinnable war, at least in the sense that Patton meant.

It’s not that Americans, or indeed almost everyone on the planet (including Muslims) wouldn’t like America to win, for winning in Iraq means a stable, somewhat democratic and functioning Muslim state. But it’s unclear if we can win and at what cost (bombing more brown people?). Senator McCain is in the unenviable position of having to convince Americans that we can indeed win, although he may, depending on circumstances in Iraq in October and November, have a difficult time doing so, particularly with Americans who watch the news or read the papers carefully. (“Who are you going to believe, me or your lying eyes?”)

The question of significance to American voters is whether a graceful and orderly disentanglement, which Obama prefers, or an all-out effort to secure victory, which McCain does, is most likely to succeed and at what cost. If McCain is right and a withdrawal from Iraq means new beheading videos on the Internet, then one might argue we need to stay there until every last extremist with a butcher’s knife, a video camera, and a flawed reading of the Koran is vanquished. If he’s wrong, and staying in Iraq whether we “win” or not means we see more young Muslims blowing themselves up on the London tube or double-decker buses, or even trying to blow up American airliners, then perhaps Obama has it right, at least in terms of the damage Iraq continues to do to American interests both on the ground and far afield. One has to wonder if there isn’t there a third alternative, though, a way to “win” without an open-ended commitment to keeping troops based in Iraq? Probably not, but perhaps the Iranians, who seem to have more influence in Iraq than either the U.S. or even individual Iraqi leaders, can help us out here, maybe even find it in themselves to ally with us to win the war. Perhaps, if we talk to them nicely, but surely not if we bomb, bomb, bomb them?

American foreign policy, and foreign policy as it applies to the Middle East, will be a crucial factor in the fall campaign. Not because Qaddafi is still obsessed with a 20th-century Palestinian cause, nor necessarily because Senator McCain believes Iran’s 21st-century nuclear progress must be halted at any cost, even if it means another war. It will be crucial because both candidates recognize that many things that affect us, from terrorism to war to America’s standing in the world, and closer to home, the now stratospheric (to Americans) cost of oil, are tied up in the Middle East. The question is which candidate recognizes that what is good for the Middle East is probably good for Americans too?

Hooman Majd is the author of The Ayatollah Begs to Differ: The Paradox of Modern Iran, and has interpreted for two presidents of Iran during their visits to the United States. He can be reached at hmajd@observer.com.

In the first week of January 2008, as most Americans were focused on the presidential campaign and the Iowa caucuses, the Supreme Leader of Iran, Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, declared in a speech in Yazd that Iran was not quite ready to resume full relations with the United States.

Mr. Khamenei (and not the far more colorful President Ahmadinejad), who really makes the decisions in Iran, did not rule out relations with the U.S. at some unspecified future time, and pointedly remarked that “we have never said this relationship should be cut forever.”

By Iran’s standards, Mr. Khamenei’s public speech was as close to an olive branch as is possible, and it’s conceivable, if not actually likely, that the Bush administration will view it that way. It may be that George W. Bush will still try to give the eventual Republican candidate a much-needed boost with a salvaged Iraq and a somewhat stable Middle East, and after seven years in office, even he realizes that neither is possible without bringing Iran in from the cold.

Either way, the move caps a fairly remarkable turnaround in U.S.-Iran relations. A new war, with Iran, had looked frighteningly possible as late as in the fall, when the administration labeled the Iranian Revolutionary Guards a terrorist entity (following Congress’ lead). But all that shifted late in the year, with the release of the anticlimactic National Intelligence Estimate report on Iran’s nuclear program—the report concluded that Iran was not developing nuclear weapons. It was followed in short order by official administration and Pentagon praise for Iran’s efforts to reign in the violence in post-surge Iraq.

There’s a certain political logic to all of this.

Mr. Bush surely realizes that his legacy will rest more on Iraq than on any other decision he has made as president. As such, the president must view the declining violence and instability in Iraq, attributable to the troop surge as well as Iran’s influence with Shia militias, as a rare glimmer of hope. The troop surge, the president knows, cannot be maintained indefinitely, even if he had a third term in office. Iran’s assistance and participation in the rebuilding of Iraq, however, particularly after a drawdown in troop numbers and American personnel, is a logistically achievable possibility.

That conciliatory approach, as far as the Iranians are concerned and despite U.S. rhetoric and sanctions over its nuclear program, already includes what is of paramount importance to the Islamic Republic: recognition of Iran as a regional power, and security, albeit unwritten and informal, from military attack or regime-change plots. The somewhat humiliating U.S. admission that it requires Iranian help in Iraq, the requests for meetings in Baghdad and the subsequent praise and recognition of Iran’s power to stem the violence, satisfied the first Iranian concern while the release of the N.I.E., for all intents and purposes, satisfied the second.

Since the release of the N.I.E. report, American allies in the Arab world also seem to have concluded that America will not go to war with Iran, and that a positive outcome in Iraq is more important to the U.S. than Arab concerns with a powerful Persia. They have virtually tripped over themselves in a rush to curry favor with Tehran. President Ahmadinejad’s invitation to Qatar in early December 2007 to attend the Gulf Cooperation Council summit, an invitation made personally by Qatar’s emir, Sheik al-Thani, and the first ever such invitation to an Iranian president, actually coincided with the release of the N.I.E. report in Washington, and it kicked off a flurry of Arab-Iranian diplomacy that continues into 2008.

King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, a country most concerned with Iran’s power and influence, which largely comes at its cost, followed Qatar’s suit with an unprecedented invitation to Mr. Ahmadinejad to attend the Haj pilgrimage in Mecca before the year ended, also a first for a sitting Iranian president. And Egypt, as long an adversary of the Islamic Republic as the U.S., took unusual steps in attempting a reconciliation with Tehran.

Apart from an official visit to Iran by the Egyptian deputy foreign minister, unusual in itself for countries that do not have diplomatic relations, Ali Larijani, the Supreme Leader’s close adviser and one of Iran’s most senior officials, spent a holiday in Egypt with his family, and met with Egyptian officials, including the foreign and intelligence ministers. It was an unmistakable sign that Iran’s real center of power was taking an active interest in expanding relations with the Arab world at an advantageous time and on advantageous terms to Iran.

Mr. Ahmadinejad, who had enthusiastically and naïvely crowed that Iran was ready to resume full diplomatic relations with Egypt only a short while before Mr. Larijani’s trip, was embarrassingly contradicted in Cairo by Mr. Larijani, who suggested that relations had a long way to go before full resumption of ties, a further indication that the Supreme Leader was not about to allow his inexperienced president a foreign policy decision before Iran could extract the maximum possible advantage. (And Mr. Ahmadinejad, apparently furious at Mr. Larijani’s diplomatic role, insisted that his visit had merely been a personal one.)

Some analysts have suggested that the Arabs, relieved that the N.I.E. report concludes that Iran is not developing nuclear weapons, are open to furthering ties with Iran at a time when it actually is less of a threat, and therefore might even give them the upper hand. But that flies in the face of logic, for the Arabs, after all, know as well as President Bush does that Iran has spinning, functional centrifuges enriching uranium, a technology they themselves are years away from if they even decided to enter an arms race.

The N.I.E. report, by greatly diminishing the chance of war and by making meaningful sanctions unlikely, combined with a Western acceptance of some level of Iranian uranium enrichment on its own soil, means that the Arabs’ only alternative with respect to Iran is to become its friend.

After all, that’s where America seems headed.

Hooman Majd is an Iranian-American writer who has interpreted for two presidents of Iran during their visits to the United States. He can be reached at hmajd@observer.com.

Mr. Ahmadinejad, in his interview with Mr. Pelley just before he left Tehran, professed bewilderment at the notion that Americans might be insulted by his presence on America’s hallowed ground.

He will also no doubt be confused that he’s receiving so much attention in the first place.

Contrary to conventional American wisdom, Mr. Ahmadinejad is not the powerful player in Iran that he’s cracked up to be. And ironically, all the fuss surrounding his mere presence in the city will serve mostly to boost Mr. Ahmadinejad’s own agenda, which is to be the spokesman for not just the Iranian nation but for the entire oppressed Third World.

Mr. Ahmadinejad is a tailor-made villain for Americans, given his desire to see “Israel wiped off the map,” his questions about the Holocaust, and the Bush administration’s forceful insistence that he is the leader of a nation that is the “No. 1 state sponsor of terrorism.”

Even here, though, the man falls somewhat short of the myth. While he would no doubt like to see Israel disappear from the map—although his actual words were the “regime that occupies Jerusalem,” which arguably means the government, not the people—he is not in much of a position to do anything about it. The president of Iran, unlike the president of the United States, has no control over the military apparatus of his country or its foreign policy.

Mr. Ahmadinejad’s questioning of the Holocaust, while inexcusable for a supposedly highly educated (albeit ill-traveled) president of a country, seems so cataclysmic precisely because it has been coupled with the idea that he might actually one day have the ability, through the acquirement of nuclear weapons, to perpetrate another one. But again, he won’t. (Not even on Iran’s own population of some 30,000 Jews, the second-largest community in the Middle East after Israel.)

He simply doesn’t have the power. President Bush may like to call his titular Iranian counterpart the “leader” of Iran, but that position, literally, belongs to Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution. It is to the Supreme Leader that the military, including the Revolutionary Guards, reports, and it is the Supreme Leader who sets Iran’s foreign policy. The president may have a say, as do countless other individuals, clerical and lay, in the Machiavellian competing centers of power in Tehran, but he is not, unlike Mr. Bush, The Decider. But Mr. Ahmadinejad, even if his country possesses nuclear weapons and the delivery systems they require at some point in the future, will not have his finger on the button.

And suggesting that he orchestrates the actions of the No. 1 state sponsor of terrorism (and Iran will freely admit to its support, at least moral, of Hezbollah and Hamas) is a deliberate effort to prompt the image for Americans of swarthy men with box cutters on American airplanes. Iran’s foreign policy has always been one of supporting Muslim “liberation” organizations, a policy it is well aware is supported by millions of Muslims throughout the world even as it is condemned by the U.S. and its allies.

It is a policy that the Iranian government views as negotiable, as the Iranian government indicated in a memo to the Bush administration way back in 2003. Former President Khatami was the would-be negotiator then, and Mr. Ahmadinejad might be the would-be negotiator now, but neither would be able to conclude any negotiations without the direct approval of the Supreme Leader.

Moreover, Mr. Ahmadinejad lacks a popular mandate. As I saw on my most recent trip to Tehran, he is in similar shape domestically to Mr. Bush, with low poll ratings and general dissatisfaction with his administration. His management of the economy, the No. 1 issue for Iranians and one area he is ostensibly responsible for, has been a dismal failure by many accounts and has led to unusually public rebukes in the Iranian media, and his support for hard-line crackdowns on everything from protesting labor leaders to public immorality have made headlines throughout the world and made him unpopular with more moderate Iranians (who outnumber hard-line conservatives, as they’ve shown in every national election of the past 10 years with the singular exception of the presidential election of 2005, when Ahmadinejad ran more as a populist than a hard-liner).

Those pressing issues may lead to his losing the next election in 2009, assuming he doesn’t turn the economy around—or the U.S. doesn’t carpet-bomb his country—but they won’t change the fundamental dynamics of Iranian politics. Mr. Khamenei and his closest advisers and aides will continue to set Iran’s policy as it relates to the U.S., Israel, Lebanon, Iraq and the nuclear issue, and all those policies, the ones we care about most, are open to negotiation if we have the will to sit down with the right messengers.

The president of Iran, whoever he is, will continue to come to New York yearly to address the U.N. General Assembly, and his visits will include headline-grabbing meetings, interviews and conferences as they have all this week. (His most important duty in New York, delivering Iran’s address to the U.N., which sets out its position on international affairs, is often largely overlooked because his speech usually is, unlike his other statements, rather uninflammatory, and reflects the true intentions and policies of the Islamic Republic.)

But in elevating Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to a position of power he simply doesn’t possess, the U.S. flatters him, and makes a mistake that can benefit only those who wish to see us continue on a confrontational path that could lead to war.

Hooman Majd is an Iranian-American writer who has interpreted for two presidents of Iran during their visits to the United States.

I had seen the text of Mr. Ahmadinejad’s speech before he’d even arrived in Manhattan on Monday, Sept. 18: I was his interpreter, or at least his English voice, at the U.N.

My father was an ambassador under the Shah, and I’ve spent most of my life in the U.S. After a career in the entertainment industry, I had written about President Khatami for U.S. publications and made contacts within his government. That experience, along with my credentials as an apparently trustworthy Iranian, led to my invitation to be Mr. Ahmadinejad’s translator, and to attend some of his public pit stops, as well as an Iranian-only (and me­dia-free) celebration at the Hilton. There, I thought, I’d glimpse the real Ahmadinejad.

His speech used the simple “man of the people,” anti-intellectual language that Mr. Ahmadinejad is known for, and was translated expertly. Any nuance would be in Mr. Ahmadinejad’s tone or body language, neither of which I would be able to reproduce from my booth overlooking the General Assembly.

Nuance in Persian is difficult to translate, but it can be most ­misleading—sometimes comically so—during interviews with the American press. When Brian Williams of NBC asked about Mr. Ahmadinejad’s attire—a suit rather than his trademark windbreaker—the Iranian president replied, “Sheneedem shoma kot-shalvaree hasteen, manam kot-shalvar poosheedam”—which was translated as “ … you wear a suit, so I wore a suit.” The phrase is actually much closer to “ … you are a suit, so I wore a suit.”

And when Mr. Williams asked if he wanted to see anything else in America other than Manhattan, the president’s response was yes. Pressed for details, Mr. Ahmadinejad stuck firmly to generalities, but also said, “Albateh, esrary nadareem,” which was correctly translated as “Of course, we’re not insistent.” But the meaning was closer to “Of course, we don’t really care.” While Mr. Ahmadinejad thought America might be interesting, it’s apparently not that interesting, at least to him.

Perhaps Mr. Ahmadinejad just didn’t want to tarnish his revolutionary credentials by showing overt eagerness, but the president neither ventured to any Manhattan landmarks nor expressed a desire to do so. Instead, limited by his special visa to a 25- mile radius from U.N. headquarters, Mr. Ahmadinejad spent most of his first day less than a mile away, ensconced in his suite or in meeting rooms at the Intercontinental Hotel on Lexington and 48th, which had been turned into a fortress. Midtown Manhattan through the tinted, bullet-proof windows of a government-supplied limousine is just about all that Mr. Ahmadinejad has ever seen of America—other than his rides to and from J.F.K., which have been under cover of darkness.

Coca Leaves and Chadors

The Tuesday afternoon before his speech, President Ahmadinejad didn’t seem particularly concerned that he was missing both a luncheon given by Kofi Annan (the fact that wine was being served may have had something to do with his absence) or President Bush’s own highly anticipated speech at the U.N. Mr. Ahmadinejad and I spoke briefly about his own speech, before he was whisked away by his minders.

An hour later, I made my way to the floor of the General Assembly and sat on one side, flanked by two Iranian diplomats and facing Evo Morales of Bolivia. I was more than a little nervous. I fought the temptation to ask if I could have my picture taken with the Bolivian head of state (which would have been a certain hit with some friends) and, since I was in the midst of a nicotine fit, to also ask him if I could bum a coca leaf or two. (He later brandished a leaf during his speech.)

Anxious, I decided to take a walk around the hall and came across Mr. Ahmadinejad’s wife, milling about in full black chador, protected by a lone female Secret Service agent. I knew that she, unlike the wives of previous Iranian dignitaries, had accompanied him on his trip. It would have been both un-Islamic and rude of me to approach her, so I watched as Mrs. Ahmadinejad made her way to a row of seats off in one corner behind the podium to wait for her husband’s speech.

Attendance was curiously sparse, perhaps because of the evening hour and the fact that the speech was being carried live on CNN. The Iraqi delegation, however, was in full attendance. Presumably they were not willing to offend their true patrons.

I began to sweat. The realization hit me that whatever I said would be heard the world over, and all I could think of was Ronald Reagan’s infamous “We begin bombing in five minutes” quip into what he thought were unplugged microphones. I had no intention of veering from the text, but it was both tantalizing and terrifying to know that a few extra words here and there would create headlines and headaches across the globe, if not land me either in Gitmo or Evin prison in Tehran.

In fact, I remember little of Mr. Ahmadinejad’s speech or my reading of it; I was far too busy concentrating on listening to him in one ear, checking where we were in the text, and watching him out of the corner of one eye. After the address was over, I was stopped by an African U.N. security guard; he begged me for a copy of the speech, saying it was the best thing he’d ever heard. I had left my copy behind in the booth. The Iranian diplomat with me promised him a personal copy on Islamic Republic of Iran letterhead.

Mr. Ahmadinejad, although mobbed by a throng of well-wishers, thanked me rather graciously. “I heard from everyone you sounded great,” he said. “Thank you so much.” When he speaks to you (and maybe this is more relevant if you’re a fellow Iranian), Mr. Ahmadinejad is not only charming, but his tone is one of genuine friendliness— a remarkable ability to make you think he relates to you. Even his dress—the simply cut pale gray suit, one of three that he apparently owns, as well as the windbreaker and the inexpensive loafers (the better for slipping on and off for prayers)—seem less like political affectations and more a reflection of who he really is: a regular Muslim guy who happens to be the president of a now-powerful nation.

The following morning, Mr. Ahmadinejad held a 7:30 a.m. breakfast meeting, again at his hotel, with American academics and journalists. Earlier, he had expressed some interest in having Michael Moore attend, and although attempts were made to reach him (even by myself, since I was asked), they were unsuccessful. I was seated between Gary Sick (of Columbia University) and Jon Lee Anderson (of The New Yorker), and three hot issues were covered: nuclear power, Israel and the Holocaust.

Mr. Ahmadinejad didn’t seem to tire of repeating the responses he had given over and over. The participants were polite and respectful, and if they held any misgivings about breaking bread with someone seemingly reviled by a large number of their fellow New Yorkers as not only perfidious but extremely dangerous, they didn’t show it. Anderson Cooper of CNN posed the softest if not most pro-Iran question of the morning when he asked about the country’s rather under-publicized but valiant efforts at fighting the Afghan opium trade. I realized later that the question must have been intended to help land the unscheduled short interview that Mr. Cooper conducted for CNN that night.

As he left the breakfast, Mr. Ahmadinejad once again thanked me for my U.N. performance and said that he had heard from all over the world—specifying Senegal, which he had visited on his way to New York—that the speech was really beautiful.

‘It’s Gotten Much Better’

What were not covered by the media were Mr. Ahmadinejad’s last two appearances on the Thursday afternoon before he left the city. The previous week, the Iranian Mission to the U.N. had sent out invitations to two select groups of Iranians: first, a group of some 50 or so to attend a private meeting with the president, and second, another group of 500 to attend a dinner where he would give a short speech.

The location was kept secret until the last day. Guests had to e-mail their RSVP’s and receive an e-mail back with the details. I received an e-mail with just an address: the Hilton on Sixth Avenue.

There, in a large conference room, a group consisting mostly of men gathered at tables. They were academics, physicians and businessmen—all successful Iranians (mostly from New York and New Jersey) who were largely observant Muslims as well as supporters of the Islamic Republic. They gave the president a standing ovation. Flanked by U.N. Ambassador Javad Zarif, and with his closest advisor and political mentor, Mojtaba Hashemi-Samareh, not far behind (a mysterious, almost Karl Rovean figure, Mr. Hashemi-Samareh always seems to be at his side), the Iranian president said nothing while another deputy, who sat immediately to his left, launched into a chillingly beautiful recital from the Koran.

The president made notes as people spoke into a microphone. One woman asked the president to relax the rules on hijab for women in Iran. Although wearing a scarf herself, living in the U.S. for many years has seemed to have divorced her from the reality of velayat-e-faqi, or “rule of the jurisprudent,” which means that at least in terms of social issues, it’s the Supreme Leader who decides what society will look like, not the president. The president continued writing, however, pausing briefly and looking up when his chador-clad wife quietly entered the room with two other women and took her seat at the end of his table. (Later, he would ignore the hijab issue entirely.)

Another questioner self-importantly pontificated for a while and then expressed his dismay that in the year since the president’s last visit to New York, relations between the U.S. and Iran had taken a turn for the worse. The man said he remembered last year’s event very well; he was seated in exactly the same place as this year.

Suddenly, the president interrupted him to say that he was, in fact, seated one chair over.

“Indeed,” replied the surprised and disarmed Iranian, “and mash’allah [praise Allah] for your intelligence and memory!” The president’s showing-off seemed calculated to impress that, contrary to some claims—particularly among expatriate Iranians—he was no dummy.

Mr. Ahmadinejad extolled the greatness of Iran, Iranians and Iranian society. “Americans are good people too,” he said, “but there’s a distance between our cultures.

“Let me explain a few points,” Mr. Ahmadinejad continued. “One gentleman said the situation between America and Iran has gotten worse. No. It’s not worse than last year; it’s better. Better.

“Last year,” he said, “we were under serious threats—military threats. Today, at the very worst, it’s economic threats, and even that—well, I don’t really want to say, but for those who would like to pursue them, the situation is not conducive …. Even though there are those in America who would like to put pressure on Iran, they won’t be able to. We’ve really progressed. You see, 118 countries [of the Non-Aligned Movement] have specifically supported Iran’s nuclear program. That’s eliminated the excuse that four or five countries speak for the ‘international community.’

“In Indonesia, when I went there, there were great demonstrations in our favor,” he said. “And wherever we went in Asia, we heard shouts of ‘Ahmadinejad, we support you against America!’” He repeated the slogan in English—a language that, judging by his pronunciation, he obviously speaks well enough, but rarely uses.

“Our political situation, by God’s grace, is great,” he went on. “For those who don’t want our people to progress, the situation is not good. In the Middle East, the situation for America has become very bad. Very. They thought if they attack Lebanon, their situation would get better,” he said, allowing no difference between Israel and the United States. “They gave 33 days to the Zionists to do something in Lebanon, and it didn’t happen. Same thing in Iraq; same thing in Afghanistan. It’s not that our situation has gotten worse in the last year; it’s that it’s gotten much better.

“As for America,” he said, “we will not be dictated to. Don’t forget that it was America that unilaterally broke off relations with Iran …. I remember Mr. Carter saying that to punish Iran, we will break diplomatic relations.” (Mr. Ahmadinejad neglected to point out that the “punishment” was in retaliation for Iran seizing all American diplomats in Iran, holding them hostage and occupying the U.S. diplomatic premises.)

“And now,” he added, “some of them expect us to go and beg for the resumption of relations. We’ll never do that. There’s not one Iranian in the world who would ask us do that,” he said, as if challenging any Iranians in this part of the world to do so.

“Never,” he emphasized. “For what?”

President Ahmadinejad, apparently satisfied that he had convinced everyone that Iran was strong, moved on to the question of Iran’s nuclear program. “If, God forbid—God forbid—we budge on this issue, they’ll next say, ‘You have to give up your chemistry departments in your universities, and your physics departments too.’ Then even the medical schools.” The president’s tone wasn’t bombastic; if anything, it was very matter-of-fact. “It’s clear that they don’t want us to progress,” he said. “Of course, not all Americans—Americans are good people.

“Two thousand Zionists want to rule the world. You can do it elsewhere,” he said, as if speaking directly to the mysterious 2,000, “but not in Iran. It’s impossible—it’s not doable.”

‘Palestinians’

That evening’s dinner, for 500 loyal Iranians, was held in a grand ballroom of the Hilton. The crowd, consisting of Iranians who are fiercely nationalistic and more positively inclined to the Islamic Republic, greeted their president with prolonged applause. The national anthem played loudly over the speaker system, and to anyone who harbors suspicions that 2006 Iran is reminiscent of 1936 Germany, this event would have appeared to have some of the trappings of a Bund rally in 1930’s New York.

But the similarities to a Bund rally were in the expression of Persian pride and nationalistic and Islamic sentiments—the president’s speech wasn’t a call to arms, nor even particularly inflammatory. A table behind mine was filled with men wearing the Palestinian keffiyeh. They were the most vocal in the room, with shouts of “Allah-u-akbar!” every now and then. A lady sitting next to me wondered out loud if they were even Iranian, or whether they might in fact be—and she said this with not a little disgust—Palestinians.

In his speech—and no doubt the room had been bugged—the president vehemently denied that Iran seeks nuclear weapons. “The time for bombs is over,” he said. “If an atomic bomb could protect a country, then it would have protected the Soviet Union; it wouldn’t have disappeared. If atomic weapons could protect,” and he paused here for a moment, “then those gentlemen who attacked Lebanon would have taken it.”

When he finished speaking, the cheers were punctuated by repeated shouts from the men in keffiyehs jumping up and down right behind me, as they chanted over and over, “Praise [or salaam] to the Prophet Mohammad ... boo-yeh Rajai aamad [we can smell a Rajai]!” (Mohammad Ali Rajai was the only other Iranian from humble origins who became president during the Islamic Republic’s 27-year history; he was assassinated by terrorists.)

Dinner was then served by the harried staff of the Hilton: large platters of steaming Persian saffron rice; equally large platters of kebabs; silver pots of a pomegranate-walnut stew ($70-a-barrel oil guarantees a good meal). After his prayers, Mr. Ahmadinejad stood at the head of a receiving line and, for two hours, said hello and shook hands with every single person in the long line—except the women, of course, who were content with an Islamic-appropriate hello and nod of the head.

His man-of-the-people reputation intact, he left the Hilton. The Iranians streamed out onto Sixth Avenue after an evening of celebrating Iran, its president and their own Iranian-ness, New Yorkers once again. Until another visit from Mr. Ahmadinejad, that is.

But anyone who knows anything about Iranian politics would have known that Iranian politicians and diplomats take subtlety to levels that require a new definition of the word—and whether there was indeed anything to be read into Mr. Khatami’s trip beyond its stated purpose, even the most astute diplomats, dignitaries and media experts who met him were left guessing. But perhaps the stated purpose, one of dialogue and the encouragement of peaceful resolution to conflicts, was enough.

I accompanied the former Iranian president on his travels in the U.S. (I first met Mr. Khatami when I interviewed him for GQ in 2005, and we’d stayed in touch since then.) And as striking as the symbolism of his presence on our shores was, one can’t help but think that the thousands of Americans who saw him were left with a different, hopefully better understanding of Iran and Iranians.

It is not entirely clear why the U.S. administration decided to issue Mr. Khatami a visa to visit the U.S. in the first place, given that his trip coincided with Iran’s refusal to abide by the U.N. Security Council deadline demanding that it stop uranium enrichment. And one of the punishments, or even sanctions, that the U.S. has specifically mentioned should Iran remain defiant of the U.N. resolution is a restriction on overseas travel by Iranian officials. While Mr. Khatami is not officially an official, he was nonetheless the president of Iran when it was inducted into the “axis of evil” by Mr. Bush, and he remains—at least in some quarters in Congress, the media and even the Simon Wiesenthal Center—an enemy of the nation.

Mr. Bush’s reason for approving Mr. Khatami’s travel request—that he “wanted to hear what he has to say”—rings hollow. Undoubtedly, he wasn’t referring to Mr. Khatami’s speeches or interviews with the press, but rather the translated transcripts of every word uttered by Mr. Khatami and his aides—say in the armored limos thoughtfully provided by the State Department. Had Mr. Bush been in a listening mood, it would have been far easier to just pop over a block or so from the White House to the Willard Hotel for a cup of tea with Mr. Khatami and hear it straight from the horse’s mouth.

Mr. Khatami arrived in New York on Aug. 31, at almost the exact hour that U.N. Ambassador John Bolton declared that the deadline would pass for Iran to comply with the U.N. resolution on enrichment. And Mr. Bolton’s own State Department met Mr. Khatami’s Austrian Airlines jet at Kennedy, on the tarmac, with a full contingent of security provided by the department’s Diplomatic Security Service (along with the NYPD and the New York State Police). Mr. Khatami was whisked to the residence of the Iranian Ambassador to the U.N., one of the few stately mansions on Fifth Avenue, and he settled in for a quiet day of rest before his tour began in earnest.

It was not all catching up on jet lag, though, for the residence was teeming with Mr. Khatami’s entourage from Tehran and staff from the Iranian mission to the U.N. (as well as myself), and discussions immediately began on what the important aspects of the visit were and who Mr. Khatami should talk to. It was almost as if no one, including the arrivals from Tehran, had really believed they’d be sitting overlooking the Met and Central Park with Mr. Khatami that day (and perhaps they didn’t believe it yet). More than once, I heard them say—as if it was just dawning on them—that if all went well, Mr. Khatami’s trip might not only influence American ideas about Iran, but also Iranian ideas about America.

Many hard-liners in Tehran had vehemently opposed this trip, but some political quarters of the U.S., as well as some in the media, claimed that Mr. Khatami’s trip was Iranian “propaganda,” or designed by Iran’s Supreme Leader, the Ayatollah Khamenei, to present a soft image of Iran at the opportune time. One writer, the wife of a senior member of current Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s administration, had published an article in a conservative daily decrying Mr. Khatami’s U.S. visit; in response, a reform newspaper, Shargh, published a piece subtly pointing out that her views were shared by “Zionist” groups in America. ( Shargh has been since shut down, ostensibly for technical reasons.) Other Iranian hard-liners had called for him to be defrocked for even thinking of going to America.

But the Iranians on Fifth Avenue were making extensive plans for Mr. Khatami’s visit. The Bush administration had already forbidden contact between current U.S. government officials and Mr. Khatami, but based on the requests and inquiries pouring in, there were apparently many former government officials who were keen to see him, along with countless other influential Americans.

Between all the back and forth on the details of the trip, Mr. Khatami, his delegation, the Iranian diplomats in New York, a few ex-officials now living in the U.S., and a university professor or two on sabbatical in the U.S. reminisced over a never-ending supply of hot tea and plates of fresh fruit. Among Mr. Khatami’s delegation were his former chief of staff, Ali Khatami (his brother), as well as ex-ambassadors and deputy foreign ministers—all working with Mr. Khatami at his new International Institute of Dialogue Among Cultures and Civilizations in Tehran. Some of them hadn’t seen their friends in the U.S. for quite some time. There was an atmosphere of relaxed jollity—at times, howls of laughter at the occasional joke or political story.

The main concern of the party, according to the Mr. Khatami and his aides, was to represent their country well and to correct, to the extent that they could, any wrong impressions that Americans might have of Iran and Iranians. Mr. Khatami was convinced, he said, that the nuclear issue could be resolved through negotiations. (Although Mr. Khatami has no real or official power, his influence inside Iran is still strong; he has good relationships not only with many in the clergy, but also among many policymakers.)

After an uneventful visit to the Met the next morning, Mr. Khatami and his delegation departed for Chicago. Luggage was laid out on the sidewalk on Fifth Avenue, sniffed by dogs and then loaded into a van. The Diplomatic Security Service provided a limo, two S.U.V.’s loaded with agents and another with a machine-gun-toting SWAT team (who stood outside, fingers by their triggers and eyes scanning the surroundings). Bemused passersby looked on as the robed and turbaned Mr. Khatami got into an armored Cadillac with D.C. plates and the motorcade took off, the SWAT team’s guns sticking out of the open back gate of a Suburban weaving across lanes cleared of traffic. Security at the airport was equally tight; although we were driven right onto the tarmac, we had to go up a set of stairs right by the gate and then walk down the gangway onto the plane, with the SWAT team lining the route.

We boarded first, and as the other passengers came on, I overheard one young woman chatting loudly to a friend on her cell phone. “Have you flown since the incident?” she asked a friend, clearly referring to the London plot of a few weeks prior. “You can’t believe it,” she continued, “there are guys with machine guns on the gangway.” She was blissfully unaware of Mr. Khatami in 2A, and I didn’t want to rob her of the satisfaction she expressed to her friend that her flight was well protected.

Labor Day weekend in Chicago—or at least at the Sofitel O’Hare and the convention center across the street—was like what I imagine a weekend in Mecca might be, albeit with an American police presence. Some 30,000 Muslims had gathered for a convention, and they were all going to listen to Mr. Khatami deliver the keynote speech. Muslims of every ethnic background roamed the wide suburban sidewalks and the lobbies of the cluster of hotels, whose bars were completely deserted. It was teatime, all the time. The point was emphasized again and again: Muslims in America have to promote their faith as one of peace, and they have to integrate with and engage their fellow Americans. (On more than one occasion, I was sorely tempted to interrupt various speakers to suggest that perhaps if they wanted to integrate, some of them might want to discourage their wives and daughters from wearing burqas or full hijabs on suburban Chicago streets—but I held my tongue.)

Mr. Khatami’s speech, held in a large auditorium and beamed to the adjacent main hall of the convention center, was punctuated by cheers and applause and interrupted by one African gentleman, who first sang praises, griot style, before Mr. Khatami could start, and then alternately screamed “Allah-u-Akbar!” upon hearing something Islamic and Koranic and “That’s right!” when a political point was made. The speech was a big hit with the crowd, who seemed less interested in the political significance of Mr. Khatami’s trip or in U.S.-Iran relations than in having a Muslim (albeit Shiite) leader of global repute speak at their yearly gathering.

Mr. Khatami returned to New York for two days to attend a U.N. “Alliance of Civilizations” conference before heading to Washington, where his planned speech at the Washington Cathedral was drawing much attention from the media. In between sessions at the U.N., he attended two private dinners at the U.N. Ambassador’s residence—one for a select group of Iranians, the other for an even more select group of influential Americans. I was given access, but the dinners were strictly off the record. My sense was that the Americans left with a clearer understanding of the nuclear issue, perhaps even with a more favorable impression of Iran in general and the Iranian position in particular. Mr. Khatami’s own image, if it had ever been tarnished, was clearly elevated in the minds of those I spoke to.

In Washington, other than his speech at the Washington Cathedral, Mr. Khatami attended a meeting and a luncheon at Georgetown University; then we drove to the University of Virginia, where he delivered another speech to students and faculty (who seemed a little dazed and unsure of why he was there), and then to Monticello to tour Thomas Jefferson’s home. Mr. Khatami attended a gathering of Shiites celebrating the Mahdi’s birthday (the twelfth, and missing, Imam), as well as various other private dinners. His motorcade, which included police motorcycles, was even bigger and the security generally tighter in the Washington area than anywhere else, and many onlookers must have thought that they were seeing the President of the United States passing by, judging by the waves and applause we were greeted with by some of the tourists, and the finger we were given by the peace activists across from the White House.

On one occasion, driving to Georgetown from downtown D.C., we careened through the narrow streets with sirens blaring and at such speed that one of the ex-ambassadors in Mr. Khatami’s entourage, watching the startled faces of pedestrians and other drivers, jokingly asked me if I didn’t think the motorcade itself was a form of terrorism perpetrated on the American people.

Mr. Khatami was generally asked the same questions at virtually every non-Islamic event he attended in Washington, and his answers were consistent, if not always satisfying. While he clearly felt comfortable defending Hezbollah, he was careful to distance himself, even all Iranians, from Mr. Ahmadinejad’s remarks on Israel and the Holocaust, without overly criticizing the new president. The only surprising comment on Iraq came when he was asked by reporters whether the U.S. forces should leave right away: He said he didn’t think so, at least not until the Iraqi government could provide security to its people. On the nuclear issue, he was emphatic that Iran was not seeking weapons and suggested that the U.S. enter negotiations without preconditions immediately, as he believes a negotiated settlement is not only preferable but possible.

At Harvard, Mr. Khatami was prepared for the worst. Not only had Massachusetts Governor Mitt Romney refused to allow state employees to provide him any security, but had also called him a terrorist. Protests had been planned, and some students had announced that they were going to confront him with very tough questions. Mr. Khatami again handled the questions he was thrown with extreme skill. In response to a question about Israel, however, he replied that he didn’t believe in wiping anyone or anything off the map, but wanted to remind the audience that a place called Palestine had been wiped off the map for 50 years with little objection from the international community. His remark drew much applause and no audible jeering.

There were moments that gave real hope to those who were looking for signs—any signs—that a real conflict with Iran could be avoided. One could tell by the expressions on people’s faces, by the way they responded to him. Mr. Khatami’s U.S. adventure began on a day when Iran defied the U.N. and the world, and it ended on the fifth anniversary of Sept. 11—a day of tragedy that, he often pointed out, he was one of the first world leaders to condemn. Many of the Americans he met expressed the wish that he was still the president of Iran rather than the incorrigible Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, but maybe it’s better that he isn’t. One wonders if perhaps now he can do what no one who holds that office can: bring the Americans and the Iranians closer together, even just a bit.

But anyone who knows anything about Iranian politics would have known that Iranian politicians and diplomats take subtlety to levels that require a new definition of the word—and whether there was indeed anything to be read into Mr. Khatami’s trip beyond its stated purpose, even the most astute diplomats, dignitaries and media experts who met him were left guessing. But perhaps the stated purpose, one of dialogue and the encouragement of peaceful resolution to conflicts, was enough.

I accompanied the former Iranian president on his travels in the U.S. (I first met Mr. Khatami when I interviewed him for GQ in 2005, and we’d stayed in touch since then.) And as striking as the symbolism of his presence on our shores was, one can’t help but think that the thousands of Americans who saw him were left with a different, hopefully better understanding of Iran and Iranians.

It is not entirely clear why the U.S. administration decided to issue Mr. Khatami a visa to visit the U.S. in the first place, given that his trip coincided with Iran’s refusal to abide by the U.N. Security Council deadline demanding that it stop uranium enrichment. And one of the punishments, or even sanctions, that the U.S. has specifically mentioned should Iran remain defiant of the U.N. resolution is a restriction on overseas travel by Iranian officials. While Mr. Khatami is not officially an official, he was nonetheless the president of Iran when it was inducted into the “axis of evil” by Mr. Bush, and he remains—at least in some quarters in Congress, the media and even the Simon Wiesenthal Center—an enemy of the nation.

Mr. Bush’s reason for approving Mr. Khatami’s travel request—that he “wanted to hear what he has to say”—rings hollow. Undoubtedly, he wasn’t referring to Mr. Khatami’s speeches or interviews with the press, but rather the translated transcripts of every word uttered by Mr. Khatami and his aides—say in the armored limos thoughtfully provided by the State Department. Had Mr. Bush been in a listening mood, it would have been far easier to just pop over a block or so from the White House to the Willard Hotel for a cup of tea with Mr. Khatami and hear it straight from the horse’s mouth.

Mr. Khatami arrived in New York on Aug. 31, at almost the exact hour that U.N. Ambassador John Bolton declared that the deadline would pass for Iran to comply with the U.N. resolution on enrichment. And Mr. Bolton’s own State Department met Mr. Khatami’s Austrian Airlines jet at Kennedy, on the tarmac, with a full contingent of security provided by the department’s Diplomatic Security Service (along with the NYPD and the New York State Police). Mr. Khatami was whisked to the residence of the Iranian Ambassador to the U.N., one of the few stately mansions on Fifth Avenue, and he settled in for a quiet day of rest before his tour began in earnest.

It was not all catching up on jet lag, though, for the residence was teeming with Mr. Khatami’s entourage from Tehran and staff from the Iranian mission to the U.N. (as well as myself), and discussions immediately began on what the important aspects of the visit were and who Mr. Khatami should talk to. It was almost as if no one, including the arrivals from Tehran, had really believed they’d be sitting overlooking the Met and Central Park with Mr. Khatami that day (and perhaps they didn’t believe it yet). More than once, I heard them say—as if it was just dawning on them—that if all went well, Mr. Khatami’s trip might not only influence American ideas about Iran, but also Iranian ideas about America.

Many hard-liners in Tehran had vehemently opposed this trip, but some political quarters of the U.S., as well as some in the media, claimed that Mr. Khatami’s trip was Iranian “propaganda,” or designed by Iran’s Supreme Leader, the Ayatollah Khamenei, to present a soft image of Iran at the opportune time. One writer, the wife of a senior member of current Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s administration, had published an article in a conservative daily decrying Mr. Khatami’s U.S. visit; in response, a reform newspaper, Shargh, published a piece subtly pointing out that her views were shared by “Zionist” groups in America. (Shargh has been since shut down, ostensibly for technical reasons.) Other Iranian hard-liners had called for him to be defrocked for even thinking of going to America.

But the Iranians on Fifth Avenue were making extensive plans for Mr. Khatami’s visit. The Bush administration had already forbidden contact between current U.S. government officials and Mr. Khatami, but based on the requests and inquiries pouring in, there were apparently many former government officials who were keen to see him, along with countless other influential Americans.

Between all the back and forth on the details of the trip, Mr. Khatami, his delegation, the Iranian diplomats in New York, a few ex-officials now living in the U.S., and a university professor or two on sabbatical in the U.S. reminisced over a never-ending supply of hot tea and plates of fresh fruit. Among Mr. Khatami’s delegation were his former chief of staff, Ali Khatami (his brother), as well as ex-ambassadors and deputy foreign ministers—all working with Mr. Khatami at his new International Institute of Dialogue Among Cultures and Civilizations in Tehran. Some of them hadn’t seen their friends in the U.S. for quite some time. There was an atmosphere of relaxed jollity—at times, howls of laughter at the occasional joke or political story.

The main concern of the party, according to the Mr. Khatami and his aides, was to represent their country well and to correct, to the extent that they could, any wrong impressions that Americans might have of Iran and Iranians. Mr. Khatami was convinced, he said, that the nuclear issue could be resolved through negotiations. (Although Mr. Khatami has no real or official power, his influence inside Iran is still strong; he has good relationships not only with many in the clergy, but also among many policymakers.)

After an uneventful visit to the Met the next morning, Mr. Khatami and his delegation departed for Chicago. Luggage was laid out on the sidewalk on Fifth Avenue, sniffed by dogs and then loaded into a van. The Diplomatic Security Service provided a limo, two S.U.V.’s loaded with agents and another with a machine-gun-toting SWAT team (who stood outside, fingers by their triggers and eyes scanning the surroundings). Bemused passersby looked on as the robed and turbaned Mr. Khatami got into an armored Cadillac with D.C. plates and the motorcade took off, the SWAT team’s guns sticking out of the open back gate of a Suburban weaving across lanes cleared of traffic. Security at the airport was equally tight; although we were driven right onto the tarmac, we had to go up a set of stairs right by the gate and then walk down the gangway onto the plane, with the SWAT team lining the route.

We boarded first, and as the other passengers came on, I overheard one young woman chatting loudly to a friend on her cell phone. “Have you flown since the incident?” she asked a friend, clearly referring to the London plot of a few weeks prior. “You can’t believe it,” she continued, “there are guys with machine guns on the gangway.” She was blissfully unaware of Mr. Khatami in 2A, and I didn’t want to rob her of the satisfaction she expressed to her friend that her flight was well protected.

Labor Day weekend in Chicago—or at least at the Sofitel O’Hare and the convention center across the street—was like what I imagine a weekend in Mecca might be, albeit with an American police presence. Some 30,000 Muslims had gathered for a convention, and they were all going to listen to Mr. Khatami deliver the keynote speech. Muslims of every ethnic background roamed the wide suburban sidewalks and the lobbies of the cluster of hotels, whose bars were completely deserted. It was teatime, all the time. The point was emphasized again and again: Muslims in America have to promote their faith as one of peace, and they have to integrate with and engage their fellow Americans. (On more than one occasion, I was sorely tempted to interrupt various speakers to suggest that perhaps if they wanted to integrate, some of them might want to discourage their wives and daughters from wearing burqas or full hijabs on suburban Chicago streets—but I held my tongue.)

Mr. Khatami’s speech, held in a large auditorium and beamed to the adjacent main hall of the convention center, was punctuated by cheers and applause and interrupted by one African gentleman, who first sang praises, griot style, before Mr. Khatami could start, and then alternately screamed “Allah-u-Akbar!” upon hearing something Islamic and Koranic and “That’s right!” when a political point was made. The speech was a big hit with the crowd, who seemed less interested in the political significance of Mr. Khatami’s trip or in U.S.-Iran relations than in having a Muslim (albeit Shiite) leader of global repute speak at their yearly gathering.

Mr. Khatami returned to New York for two days to attend a U.N. “Alliance of Civilizations” conference before heading to Washington, where his planned speech at the Washington Cathedral was drawing much attention from the media. In between sessions at the U.N., he attended two private dinners at the U.N. Ambassador’s residence—one for a select group of Iranians, the other for an even more select group of influential Americans. I was given access, but the dinners were strictly off the record. My sense was that the Americans left with a clearer understanding of the nuclear issue, perhaps even with a more favorable impression of Iran in general and the Iranian position in particular. Mr. Khatami’s own image, if it had ever been tarnished, was clearly elevated in the minds of those I spoke to.

In Washington, other than his speech at the Washington Cathedral, Mr. Khatami attended a meeting and a luncheon at Georgetown University; then we drove to the University of Virginia, where he delivered another speech to students and faculty (who seemed a little dazed and unsure of why he was there), and then to Monticello to tour Thomas Jefferson’s home. Mr. Khatami attended a gathering of Shiites celebrating the Mahdi’s birthday (the twelfth, and missing, Imam), as well as various other private dinners. His motorcade, which included police motorcycles, was even bigger and the security generally tighter in the Washington area than anywhere else, and many onlookers must have thought that they were seeing the President of the United States passing by, judging by the waves and applause we were greeted with by some of the tourists, and the finger we were given by the peace activists across from the White House.

On one occasion, driving to Georgetown from downtown D.C., we careened through the narrow streets with sirens blaring and at such speed that one of the ex-ambassadors in Mr. Khatami’s entourage, watching the startled faces of pedestrians and other drivers, jokingly asked me if I didn’t think the motorcade itself was a form of terrorism perpetrated on the American people.

Mr. Khatami was generally asked the same questions at virtually every non-Islamic event he attended in Washington, and his answers were consistent, if not always satisfying. While he clearly felt comfortable defending Hezbollah, he was careful to distance himself, even all Iranians, from Mr. Ahmadinejad’s remarks on Israel and the Holocaust, without overly criticizing the new president. The only surprising comment on Iraq came when he was asked by reporters whether the U.S. forces should leave right away: He said he didn’t think so, at least not until the Iraqi government could provide security to its people. On the nuclear issue, he was emphatic that Iran was not seeking weapons and suggested that the U.S. enter negotiations without preconditions immediately, as he believes a negotiated settlement is not only preferable but possible.

At Harvard, Mr. Khatami was prepared for the worst. Not only had Massachusetts Governor Mitt Romney refused to allow state employees to provide him any security, but had also called him a terrorist. Protests had been planned, and some students had announced that they were going to confront him with very tough questions. Mr. Khatami again handled the questions he was thrown with extreme skill. In response to a question about Israel, however, he replied that he didn’t believe in wiping anyone or anything off the map, but wanted to remind the audience that a place called Palestine had been wiped off the map for 50 years with little objection from the international community. His remark drew much applause and no audible jeering.

There were moments that gave real hope to those who were looking for signs—any signs—that a real conflict with Iran could be avoided. One could tell by the expressions on people’s faces, by the way they responded to him. Mr. Khatami’s U.S. adventure began on a day when Iran defied the U.N. and the world, and it ended on the fifth anniversary of Sept. 11—a day of tragedy that, he often pointed out, he was one of the first world leaders to condemn. Many of the Americans he met expressed the wish that he was still the president of Iran rather than the incorrigible Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, but maybe it’s better that he isn’t. One wonders if perhaps now he can do what no one who holds that office can: bring the Americans and the Iranians closer together, even just a bit.

Although the foreign minister speaks to the media more often through press conferences, he agreed to sit down and converse with me (in Farsi) about his government’s position. Mr. Mottaki’s comments were studied and nuanced, perhaps in a way that only a fellow Iranian might pick up on, but he spoke in a frank and friendly manner. He had a message to impart to Americans—a message, incidentally, that he couldn’t communicate directly to any U.S. official, despite his rare presence in midtown Manhattan.

“The election [of President Ahmadinejad] last year,” he said, “was a very clear signal by the Iranian people that they do not completely trust the major players on the international scene, and this message needs to be understood.”

As one of the three men involved most publicly with Iran’s nuclear dossier (along with Ali Larijani and Mr. Ahmadinejad himself), one would have thought that Mr. Mottaki’s presence in New York would be the cause of some interest. But Iran’s Mission to the U.N., the 34th floor of an office tower on Third Avenue and 41st Street, was deserted. Inside, Mr. Mottaki seemed energized, despite his tireless travels, drumming up support for Iran and deflecting U.S. parries in the ongoing nuclear dispute.

“A colleague said to me,” the minister said, taking a sip of tea and shifting in his seat, “that, with the election [of Ahmadinejad], ‘You’ve returned to the period of 27 years ago.’ I agreed with him, but said there are two differences: Firstly, we are not the same people we were 27 years ago, and secondly, we have had 27 years of experience on the international stage.” Do not underestimate the Iranian leadership, he was saying, for they are not the naïve revolutionaries of 1979. His affirmation of the Iranian government’s revolutionary ideals, however, was a signal that the break with the reformist policies of the previous government was complete.

“The U.S. is a country that has used nuclear weapons,” he said. “Iran has never used W.M.D.’s.” The U.S., he then pointed out, gets 25 percent of its electricity from nuclear power. “If nuclear energy is good, then why can’t Iran have it?” he asked. “And if it’s bad,” he continued, “then why does the U.S. use it?”

I suggested that the question of Iran’s rights to nuclear energy had been put to rest, even by a reluctant U.S. administration. The issue today, it seemed, was that the Americans and Europeans still don’t trust the Iranian government. The minister nodded his head. “Iran,” he said, “has never been an aggressor. Europe, just in the last century, started two world wars—so if it’s a question of trust, should it be that they trust us, or is it that we should be trusting them? In the military doctrine of Iran, there is no use for nuclear weapons. There is no reason for it. During Saddam’s war on us, he used chemical weapons repeatedly. Our military commanders went to Imam Khomeini, seeking his permission to use those kinds of weapons against Saddam’s forces, if only to forestall their further use by Iraq. Imam Khomeini did not allow it, and we have never used W.M.D.’s.”

Mr. Mottaki continued, somewhat animatedly: “I don’t need to emphasize Iran’s 10,000-year culture—a culture of peace and stability. This culture is not a mass-murdering culture, this culture is not a terrorist culture—but many Americans don’t know this. Of course, we can’t compete with the Western media—for one of the West’s great successes is in disseminating, bombarding news to the world from their perspective. But people will discover the truth. Especially today, people can find real news; they can find the truth if they want to know it.”

Then, abruptly, and as if speaking to an audience of thousands, the minister declared: “We announce that we are neither after nuclear weapons, nor do we need them—we’ve survived for 27 years without them. Today,” he continued, “controls exist to ensure that nuclear power is used exclusively for peaceful purposes. We’ve taken a greater step and said that we would open our nuclear-fuel facilities to international ownership—any company from any country in the world can be a part of a consortium to produce fuel in Iran—and this would give outsiders a direct role in our fuel production. What more can we do,” he added in a soft voice, “to convince the world that we’re only after the peaceful use of nuclear energy?”

Mr. Mottaki took another sip of tea and shifted yet again on the straight-backed sofa. “There are two options for the West,” he continued, intentionally mimicking the language of U.S. officials. “One is negotiation and a comprehensive solution that has two elements: accepting the rights of Iran and strengthening the nonproliferation regime. The other option for the West is confrontation. We are fully prepared for all options, in the same way that the U.S. says that all options are on the table.” His tone exuded supreme confidence. “However, we don’t think the U.S. taxpayer is in a position to support another conflict in our region.” He paused slightly. “Nevertheless,” he added with a certain sang-froid, “we are prepared for all options.”

I asked the minister what he thought about the precondition in the nuclear offer (that Iran must suspend enrichment before any talks). “We think that if anyone insists on preconditions,” he replied, “then there’s a fault. We’re of the opinion that if we were to accept preconditions, then what’s there to negotiate about? That’s one issue—that for negotiations, we don’t accept any preconditions.” Mr. Mottaki glanced at his watch and added, in a charming voice, “But of course, in the end, we’re not insistent [on negotiations]. The advice I can give is: Both sides have taken a positive step to create a positive atmosphere—and this atmosphere should be maintained. There shouldn’t be the language of threats, and if anyone makes any decision on Iran without Iran’s involvement, this will definitely harm this positive atmosphere.”

His comment was meant as another warning to the upcoming G-8 summit, where Iran is at the top of the agenda. “I enjoyed this,” Mr. Mottaki said, standing up. The minister needed to say his prayers, and the next day he would be flying to Gambia, in his unending quest to make Iran’s case to the international community.

Although the foreign minister speaks to the media more often through press conferences, he agreed to sit down and converse with me (in Farsi) about his government’s position. Mr. Mottaki’s comments were studied and nuanced, perhaps in a way that only a fellow Iranian might pick up on, but he spoke in a frank and friendly manner. He had a message to impart to Americans—a message, incidentally, that he couldn’t communicate directly to any U.S. official, despite his rare presence in midtown Manhattan.

“The election [of President Ahmadinejad] last year,” he said, “was a very clear signal by the Iranian people that they do not completely trust the major players on the international scene, and this message needs to be understood.”

As one of the three men involved most publicly with Iran’s nuclear dossier (along with Ali Larijani and Mr. Ahmadinejad himself), one would have thought that Mr. Mottaki’s presence in New York would be the cause of some interest. But Iran’s Mission to the U.N., the 34th floor of an office tower on Third Avenue and 41st Street, was deserted. Inside, Mr. Mottaki seemed energized, despite his tireless travels, drumming up support for Iran and deflecting U.S. parries in the ongoing nuclear dispute.

“A colleague said to me,” the minister said, taking a sip of tea and shifting in his seat, “that, with the election [of Ahmadinejad], ‘You’ve returned to the period of 27 years ago.’ I agreed with him, but said there are two differences: Firstly, we are not the same people we were 27 years ago, and secondly, we have had 27 years of experience on the international stage.” Do not underestimate the Iranian leadership, he was saying, for they are not the naïve revolutionaries of 1979. His affirmation of the Iranian government’s revolutionary ideals, however, was a signal that the break with the reformist policies of the previous government was complete.

“The U.S. is a country that has used nuclear weapons,” he said. “Iran has never used W.M.D.’s.” The U.S., he then pointed out, gets 25 percent of its electricity from nuclear power. “If nuclear energy is good, then why can’t Iran have it?” he asked. “And if it’s bad,” he continued, “then why does the U.S. use it?”

I suggested that the question of Iran’s rights to nuclear energy had been put to rest, even by a reluctant U.S. administration. The issue today, it seemed, was that the Americans and Europeans still don’t trust the Iranian government. The minister nodded his head. “Iran,” he said, “has never been an aggressor. Europe, just in the last century, started two world wars—so if it’s a question of trust, should it be that they trust us, or is it that we should be trusting them? In the military doctrine of Iran, there is no use for nuclear weapons. There is no reason for it. During Saddam’s war on us, he used chemical weapons repeatedly. Our military commanders went to Imam Khomeini, seeking his permission to use those kinds of weapons against Saddam’s forces, if only to forestall their further use by Iraq. Imam Khomeini did not allow it, and we have never used W.M.D.’s.”

Mr. Mottaki continued, somewhat animatedly: “I don’t need to emphasize Iran’s 10,000-year culture—a culture of peace and stability. This culture is not a mass-murdering culture, this culture is not a terrorist culture—but many Americans don’t know this. Of course, we can’t compete with the Western media—for one of the West’s great successes is in disseminating, bombarding news to the world from their perspective. But people will discover the truth. Especially today, people can find real news; they can find the truth if they want to know it.”

Then, abruptly, and as if speaking to an audience of thousands, the minister declared: “We announce that we are neither after nuclear weapons, nor do we need them—we’ve survived for 27 years without them. Today,” he continued, “controls exist to ensure that nuclear power is used exclusively for peaceful purposes. We’ve taken a greater step and said that we would open our nuclear-fuel facilities to international ownership—any company from any country in the world can be a part of a consortium to produce fuel in Iran—and this would give outsiders a direct role in our fuel production. What more can we do,” he added in a soft voice, “to convince the world that we’re only after the peaceful use of nuclear energy?”

Mr. Mottaki took another sip of tea and shifted yet again on the straight-backed sofa. “There are two options for the West,” he continued, intentionally mimicking the language of U.S. officials. “One is negotiation and a comprehensive solution that has two elements: accepting the rights of Iran and strengthening the nonproliferation regime. The other option for the West is confrontation. We are fully prepared for all options, in the same way that the U.S. says that all options are on the table.” His tone exuded supreme confidence. “However, we don’t think the U.S. taxpayer is in a position to support another conflict in our region.” He paused slightly. “Nevertheless,” he added with a certain sang-froid, “we are prepared for all options.”

I asked the minister what he thought about the precondition in the nuclear offer (that Iran must suspend enrichment before any talks). “We think that if anyone insists on preconditions,” he replied, “then there’s a fault. We’re of the opinion that if we were to accept preconditions, then what’s there to negotiate about? That’s one issue—that for negotiations, we don’t accept any preconditions.” Mr. Mottaki glanced at his watch and added, in a charming voice, “But of course, in the end, we’re not insistent [on negotiations]. The advice I can give is: Both sides have taken a positive step to create a positive atmosphere—and this atmosphere should be maintained. There shouldn’t be the language of threats, and if anyone makes any decision on Iran without Iran’s involvement, this will definitely harm this positive atmosphere.”

His comment was meant as another warning to the upcoming G-8 summit, where Iran is at the top of the agenda. “I enjoyed this,” Mr. Mottaki said, standing up. The minister needed to say his prayers, and the next day he would be flying to Gambia, in his unending quest to make Iran’s case to the international community.

Until last week, that is, when President George W. Bush renewed his somewhat threatening tone in a speech at the Merchant Marine Academy, telling Iran that they had better accept the deal, and soon, or else. Not to be outdone, Mr. Ahmadinejad went on Iranian television and in a matter-of-fact way said that Iran would respond to the West’s nuclear offer by, say, Aug. 22. Without a deadline written into the offer, there was very little that an astonished Mr. Bush could say, other than: Gee, that seems like an awful long time.

Regardless of the outcome of the latest round of diplomacy, a nuclear-powered (if not nuclear-armed) Iran is in the cards, and the debate on what can be done to mitigate the dangers posed by an Iran that is vastly more powerful now than when it was initiated into the “axis of evil” will continue for some time. Appropriately, the Asia Society dipped a toe into the debate waters at a recent dinner, part of the society’s “Asia On My Mind” series of events.

On hand were David Albright of the Institute for Science and International Security, a former U.N. weapons inspector and frequent commentator on Iran’s nuclear program, and Lawrence Scheinman, head of the Monterey Institute of International Studies.

As a benefit for the society (with tickets going for $500), it was a rather small gathering, befitting neither the topic nor the presence of two distinguished and experienced experts on nuclear-proliferation issues. Held in a ninth-floor room of the University Club, a smattering of wealthy Iranian-Americans joined a slightly larger number of interested Americans and the president of the Asia Society herself, Vishakha Desai. The guests seemed to be mostly from the world of banking, perhaps reflecting investment-banker host Saman Adamiyatt’s own background. The Americanized Iranians—mostly indistinguishable from their American-born counterparts except for their ever-so-slight accents—did nothing to detract from the air of an Old New York gathering.

Milling about pre-dinner, I discovered that none of the Iranians had been back to Iran since the revolution of 1979, a clear indication of where they stood vis-à-vis the Islamic regime. Despite their long separation from their homeland and their ease in American (high) society, the enormously successful Iranians were not, they told me, keen on a military solution to the conflict between the U.S. and Iran, but it was difficult to say whether they would oppose it as vehemently as some other Iranians in the U.S., a little less anti-regime, undoubtedly will.

Mr. Scheinman began the evening’s discussion by saying that the recent U.S. offer to talk to Iran is welcome not only because of concerns over Iran’s nuclear program, but because there are a “range of questions to talk to Iran about,” including “their support for terrorism” and “the fact that their president has said Israel should be wiped off the map—drive the Jews into the sea.” With no pro–Islamic Republic people in the room, that comment was left unchallenged by the Iranians, even though the phrase “drive the Jews into the sea” has never been part of the Iranian lexicon and there is much debate, both here and in Iran, over whether Mr. Ahmadinejad’s statement (more accurately translated as “this regime that occupies Jerusalem must vanish from the page of time”) can be viewed as a call to arms.

But the “wipe Israel off the map” comment, standard in any discussion of Iran, seems to play well with most American (and Iranian-American) audiences, who, after all, would probably like nothing better than to see the regime of the Islamic Republic itself “vanish from the page of time.”

Mr. Albright spoke next, and he had brought with him a document that purported to outline in detail the recent European offer made to the Iranians (but not officially made public). The offer allows Iran to have an enrichment program, but Mr. Albright made it clear that the conditions for allowing enrichment—namely that the Iranians would have to prove it was not only exclusively peaceful but also economically viable—make it a virtual certainty that enrichment activity could never happen on Iranian soil. As such, he argued, the U.S. position is not as big a shift as it might appear, and he was less than sanguine about the chances for a diplomatic solution to the crisis, particularly since the U.S. continues to refuse to give security guarantees to Iran. However, Mr. Albright said he still believed the change in the U.S. position was a welcome one because it recognized Iran’s right to nuclear energy, and because the U.S. is finally willing to negotiate after years of ruling such talks out.

In response to a question about a “grand bargain” between the U.S. and Iran, Mr. Albright thought there might be too much for such an agreement to handle: terrorism, threats against Israel and, ultimately, the problem of trust. An American woman raised her voice; “Nobody trusts one another,” she said, “but how can you trust the United States?”

“You mean under the Bush administration,” Mr. Albright replied, to the obvious dissatisfaction of one elderly guest, who muttered under his breath, “I’m offended.” But Mr. Albright, not hearing him, carried on: “We’re looking for signs that the administration wants a negotiated solution. Dr. Rice’s comments came just at the right time,” he said, for the whole diplomatic process had been “in danger of falling apart” just days prior to agreement on the European offer to the Iranians. Still, he added, “The whole thing could explode.” As in bombs over Isfahan was his clear implication.

Professor Ehsan Yarshater, Iranologist and a longtime Columbia University professor, rose to speak. “A year ago,” he said in a frail voice, “if I was asked, I would have said that the majority of Iranians would welcome an attack by the U.S. because it would be a way to get rid of a hated regime.” (Perhaps it’s a good thing he wasn’t asked, for Mr. Yarshater has had far too distinguished a career to deserve the ignominy of having become the Iranian version of Ahmad Chalabi.) But he went on to suggest that the Iraq fiasco has emboldened Iran as it has weakened the U.S., and that Iran’s deft diplomacy in exploiting the differences between the U.S., the other Western powers, the Russians and the Chinese has virtually assured that a military strike is off the table.

Mr. Scheinman stepped to the microphone for some last words. “The Iranian diplomats and negotiators I’ve dealt with,” he said, as if responding to Mr. Yarshater’s view of Iranian diplomacy, “they’re as good as they get.” It remains to be seen, of course, if they’re good enough to prevent another war.

Until last week, that is, when President George W. Bush renewed his somewhat threatening tone in a speech at the Merchant Marine Academy, telling Iran that they had better accept the deal, and soon, or else. Not to be outdone, Mr. Ahmadinejad went on Iranian television and in a matter-of-fact way said that Iran would respond to the West’s nuclear offer by, say, Aug. 22. Without a deadline written into the offer, there was very little that an astonished Mr. Bush could say, other than: Gee, that seems like an awful long time.

Regardless of the outcome of the latest round of diplomacy, a nuclear-powered (if not nuclear-armed) Iran is in the cards, and the debate on what can be done to mitigate the dangers posed by an Iran that is vastly more powerful now than when it was initiated into the “axis of evil” will continue for some time. Appropriately, the Asia Society dipped a toe into the debate waters at a recent dinner, part of the society’s “Asia On My Mind” series of events.

On hand were David Albright of the Institute for Science and International Security, a former U.N. weapons inspector and frequent commentator on Iran’s nuclear program, and Lawrence Scheinman, head of the Monterey Institute of International Studies.

As a benefit for the society (with tickets going for $500), it was a rather small gathering, befitting neither the topic nor the presence of two distinguished and experienced experts on nuclear-proliferation issues. Held in a ninth-floor room of the University Club, a smattering of wealthy Iranian-Americans joined a slightly larger number of interested Americans and the president of the Asia Society herself, Vishakha Desai. The guests seemed to be mostly from the world of banking, perhaps reflecting investment-banker host Saman Adamiyatt’s own background. The Americanized Iranians—mostly indistinguishable from their American-born counterparts except for their ever-so-slight accents—did nothing to detract from the air of an Old New York gathering.

Milling about pre-dinner, I discovered that none of the Iranians had been back to Iran since the revolution of 1979, a clear indication of where they stood vis-à-vis the Islamic regime. Despite their long separation from their homeland and their ease in American (high) society, the enormously successful Iranians were not, they told me, keen on a military solution to the conflict between the U.S. and Iran, but it was difficult to say whether they would oppose it as vehemently as some other Iranians in the U.S., a little less anti- regime, undoubtedly will.

Mr. Scheinman began the evening’s discussion by saying that the recent U.S. offer to talk to Iran is welcome not only because of concerns over Iran’s nuclear program, but because there are a “range of questions to talk to Iran about,” including “their support for terrorism” and “the fact that their president has said Israel should be wiped off the map—drive the Jews into the sea.” With no pro–Islamic Republic people in the room, that comment was left unchallenged by the Iranians, even though the phrase “drive the Jews into the sea” has never been part of the Iranian lexicon and there is much debate, both here and in Iran, over whether Mr. Ahmadinejad’s statement (more accurately translated as “this regime that occupies Jerusalem must vanish from the page of time”) can be viewed as a call to arms.

But the “wipe Israel off the map” comment, standard in any discussion of Iran, seems to play well with most American (and Iranian-American) audiences, who, after all, would probably like nothing better than to see the regime of the Islamic Republic itself “vanish from the page of time.”

Mr. Albright spoke next, and he had brought with him a document that purported to outline in detail the recent European offer made to the Iranians (but not officially made public). The offer allows Iran to have an enrichment program, but Mr. Albright made it clear that the conditions for allowing enrichment—namely that the Iranians would have to prove it was not only exclusively peaceful but also economically viable—make it a virtual certainty that enrichment activity could never happen on Iranian soil. As such, he argued, the U.S. position is not as big a shift as it might appear, and he was less than sanguine about the chances for a diplomatic solution to the crisis, particularly since the U.S. continues to refuse to give security guarantees to Iran. However, Mr. Albright said he still believed the change in the U.S. position was a welcome one because it recognized Iran’s right to nuclear energy, and because the U.S. is finally willing to negotiate after years of ruling such talks out.

In response to a question about a “grand bargain” between the U.S. and Iran, Mr. Albright thought there might be too much for such an agreement to handle: terrorism, threats against Israel and, ultimately, the problem of trust. An American woman raised her voice; “Nobody trusts one another,” she said, “but how can you trust the United States?”

“You mean under the Bush administration,” Mr. Albright replied, to the obvious dissatisfaction of one elderly guest, who muttered under his breath, “ I’m offended.” But Mr. Albright, not hearing him, carried on: “We’re looking for signs that the administration wants a negotiated solution. Dr. Rice’s comments came just at the right time,” he said, for the whole diplomatic process had been “in danger of falling apart” just days prior to agreement on the European offer to the Iranians. Still, he added, “The whole thing could explode.” As in bombs over Isfahan was his clear implication.

Professor Ehsan Yarshater, Iranologist and a longtime Columbia University professor, rose to speak. “A year ago,” he said in a frail voice, “if I was asked, I would have said that the majority of Iranians would welcome an attack by the U.S. because it would be a way to get rid of a hated regime.” (Perhaps it’s a good thing he wasn’t asked, for Mr. Yarshater has had far too distinguished a career to deserve the ignominy of having become the Iranian version of Ahmad Chalabi.) But he went on to suggest that the Iraq fiasco has emboldened Iran as it has weakened the U.S., and that Iran’s deft diplomacy in exploiting the differences between the U.S., the other Western powers, the Russians and the Chinese has virtually assured that a military strike is off the table.

Mr. Scheinman stepped to the microphone for some last words. “The Iranian diplomats and negotiators I’ve dealt with,” he said, as if responding to Mr. Yarshater’s view of Iranian diplomacy, “ they’re as good as they get.” It remains to be seen, of course, if they’re good enough to prevent another war.